When it comes to the Abraham Accords, the Trump Administration deserves the credit for taking advantage of an opportunity, one it responded to but did not initiate. It was the UAE that came to the White House in early July 2020 and offered a win for the Administration: a peace treaty between Israel and an Arab state, the first since the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty in 1994.
The price was two-fold: no Israeli annexation of the territory allotted to it in the Trump peace plan and weapons like the F-35 that had been denied to the Emirates because of the US commitment to preserving Israel's qualitative military edge. Jared Kushner understood the significance of the offer and leaped at it and then built on it in subsequent deals. With Bahrain, pressure was applied to follow on, and with Sudan and Morocco incentives were offered—being taken off the terrorism list in the case of Sudan and recognition of their sovereignty in Western Sahara for Morocco.
Still, in the past such incentives were unlikely to have worked. The region has changed. The Abraham Accords reversed the order of the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002: then, ending occupation came first and in return Israel got diplomatic recognition. Now, normalization comes first and, at least in the case of the UAE, Israel avoids taking a "negative" step toward the Palestinians. Arab states have always put their interests first before the Palestinians, even if they elevated the Palestinian cause rhetorically. What is different now is there is a loss of fear about the Palestinian ability to mobilize a threatening reaction against those Arab leaders who make the decision to normalize with Israel because it serves their interests. And, a number of Arab leaders see that Israel offers not just security benefits but can help non-military needs as well when it comes to health, water, and agriculture.
But the US still needs to play a role. The UAE wanted something from the US and that is likely to remain true with others as well. Building on the Abraham Accords won't just happen, it will require some active brokering by the Biden Administration and consideration over what those Arab states may want from us. Passive support won't add to the accords. Active brokering means talking, e.g., to Saudi leaders and exploring the menu of actions they could take publicly toward Israel, and what steps by the Israelis and by us would make it easier for the Kingdom to take those steps.
Like the Emirates, the Saudis may create a relationship between their action and what the Israelis will or will not do toward the Palestinians. The more politically significant their move, the more they may seek from the Israelis and from us in terms of assurances or even security commitments.
Bottom line: building on normalization will further change the landscape in the area and cement a coalition, not just for peace but against those most determined to threaten it like Iran and its proxies.